Abstract. In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the German economy experienced a substantial increase in unemployment among low-skilled workers. The unemployment rate of workers without vocational training has increased to about 20 per cent in West Germany, while the unemployment rate among workers with a vocational degree has increased to only 5 per cent (IAB, 2002 ). The meanstested systems of social welfare, comprising social assistance (SA) and unemployment assistance (UA), are widely perceived as a major cause of this. Both programmes provide income support predominantly for persons who do not qualify for unemployment benefits (UBs). In the recent policy debate, SA in particular has been held responsible for creating labour supply disincentives because the minimum income guarantee is too close to the earnings of low-skilled workers and the transfer withdrawal rates reach up to 100 per cent. Several reform proposals aim at improving the work incentives for low-income groups, especially the low-skilled (e.g. Sinn et al., 2002; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat, 2002; Breyer et al., 2004) . A common feature of these proposals is the reduction of marginal tax-transfer rates in the lower income ranges associated with a decrease in the minimum income guarantee (for an overview, see e.g. Zimmermann, 2003) . These proposals take a middle ground between an income maintenance system (widespread in continental Europe) and an earned income tax credit (EITC) system (introduced during the 1990s in the United States).
1 The pure income maintenance system is characterized by a high minimum guarantee and full transfer withdrawal on additional income while the EITC may be distilled to a zero income guarantee and a tax subsidy on low earnings.
These different tax and transfer systems have been analysed in a recent strand of the public finance literature from a welfare-theoretical perspective (Saez, 2002; Kleven and Kreiner, 2003; Immervoll et al., 2004) . This literature primarily addresses the questions of how the equity-efficiency tradeoff can be quantified and whether welfare weights exist that make a specific reform proposal second best. Answering these questions requires a precise distinction between the intensive and the extensive margin of labour supply. Expressed in a stylized way, Saez (2002) shows that the income maintenance system has advantages if labour supply reactions are mainly along the intensive margin, whereas the EITC is superior if the extensive margin is more important. However, using the approach of welfare analysis, one is confronted with a sharp tradeoff between institutional detail and the applicability of the rigorous analytical tools. The papers cited resolve this tradeoff by making restrictive assumptions: for example, there is neither interaction within households with more than one individual nor an endogenous adjustment of the wage rate in response to labour supply changes. By contrast, the aim of our paper is to capture institutional detail in the empirical analysis of behavioural effects and general equilibrium repercussions. We quantify the effects of recent reform proposals in terms of their impact on labour supply, employment, wages and income distribution. Our analysis remains strictly positive, but it can be seen as a first important step to derive normative conclusions on the German taxbenefit schedule and an encompassing welfare statement.
1. We follow the classification in Saez (2002) , but use the term 'income maintenance' instead of 'negative income tax'.
We consider a reform that reduces the guaranteed minimum income and lowers the transfer withdrawal for recipients of SA. Owing to the low transfer withdrawal rates, the phasing out region shifts towards higher incomes and eligibility is extended to the current 'working poor'. Some households thus face a higher marginal tax rate after the reform and may reduce their labour supply. It is not clear from the outset whether this reform will generate higher employment. Distribution analysis is complicated because the welfare position of the poor depends both on direct transfer payments and the probability of finding a job. The working poor unambiguously benefit from the reform, because they receive higher transfer payments. The current nonworking poor fare worse if they are voluntarily unemployed in the status quo. If, however, they are involuntarily unemployed, they may benefit from better job chances if the reform reduces involuntary unemployment. Thus, the reform is not a simple redistribution from the poor to the rich, but rather from the non-working poor to the working poor.
Until now, the effects of social welfare reforms in Germany have been analysed only in microsimulation studies (e.g. Buslei and Steiner, 1999; Kaltenborn, 2000; Steiner, 2000; Bonin et al., 2002; Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus, 2003 ). An apparent drawback of this approach is that the wage level and the wage structure are assumed to be constant. Additional labour supply may be expected to decrease equilibrium wages, which is likely to have negative feedback effects. In a firm-union wage-bargaining set-up, a reduction in welfare payments has an additional wage-dampening effect through the decrease in the fall-back position of union workers. To assess adequately whether the increase in labour supply can be, at least partially, absorbed by the labour market, labour demand becomes a crucial factor. Finally, adjustments of taxation required by the imperative of a balanced aggregate government budget have effects on labour supply that must be accounted for.
The model that we use to keep track of these heterogeneous effects combines microsimulation results with computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling. The microsimulation results enable us to model the heterogeneity of households and to describe the distributional effects of the reform proposals. The general equilibrium model captures the feedback effects. We use the CGE model PACE-L, which incorporates important institutional features of the German labour market, most importantly sectoral wage bargaining (Böhringer et al., 2005) . The link to microsimulation is established by a detailed representation of the German tax-benefit system and a discrete choice model of labour supply where individuals can choose from a finite set of hours (see also Boeters et al., 2005) . Discrete choice models of labour supply have recently become increasingly popular as they provide a more realistic description of supply choices (see e.g. van Soest, 1995; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) . They allow for a straightforward distinction between labour supply responses along the intensive and the extensive margin. The alternative to a discrete choice approach is to include fixed costs of working into a continuous labour supply model (Kleven and Kreiner, 2003; Immervoll et al., 2004) . However, in this kind Reforming Social Welfare in Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 of model, all households of a certain type choose the same hours of work. Our approach, in contrast, offers the advantage of differentiating labour supply in terms of the chosen working time and to account for working time categories below the average. This feature is particularly important for an analysis of the low-income sector as low-income employment may not only result from low wages but also from few hours worked.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the key features of the present German SA system and presents the main characteristics of recent reform proposals. Section 3 provides a brief description of the labour market module of the CGE model. Section 4 reports the simulation results for the partial and the general equilibrium. In Section 5, we draw the conclusions.
REFORMING SA IN GERMANY

Design of the German status quo system
SA in Germany is a means-tested transfer programme that steps in if household income falls short of a minimum level. This minimum income level depends on a large number of variables such as household size, household composition and rent. SA is paid largely unconditional as opposed to UA and the large payroll-financed transfer programmes (UBs and public pensions). SA is also paid for an unlimited time, while UBs are phased out after 12-32 months (depending on age and labour market experience). Households who receive transfer payments from other sources may also be eligible for supplemental SA. While SA recipients may retain a small fraction of labour earnings, income from other sources is fully deducted. Thus, SA payments establish a minimum income that consists of a basic rate ('Regelsatz') for the head of the household, age-dependent basic rates for each additional household member and a housing allowance for the rent (or interest on a mortgage) and heating costs. For the household head, the basic rate currently amounts to about h300 per month. At the end of 2000, 2.7 million persons or 3.3 per cent of the German population received SA. It is estimated that about 800,000 persons of the SA recipients form the 'net employment potential ' (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000) .
2 This number is obtained by excluding persons older than 60 and younger than 18 years of age, ill and unemployable individuals, persons with family responsibilities and those already employed or in training.
The German SA system is widely criticized for creating labour supply disincentives on two grounds: first, the gap between the labour earnings of low-skilled workers and the minimum income is considered too small to encourage labour market participation. The difference between earnings and SA is particularly low for households with children. In the case of a couple with one low-skilled breadwinner on a full-time job of 38 h/week, the 2. We report the figures for the year 2000, because this is the benchmark period in our model. differential amounts to about 27 per cent of the SA minimum income if two children are present, and to only 5 per cent if three children are present.
3 This is primarily due to the fact that the average SA rates for children exceed the general child benefits. Second, the transfer withdrawal rates are seen as generally too high (except for extremely low earnings), so that incentives for a marginal increase in labour market participation are also low. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between gross earnings and disposable income of a single person without children, for whom the guaranteed minimum income is approximately h600 per month. The first h75 of earnings are not withdrawn. Earnings exceeding h75 are taxed away at a marginal rate of 85 per cent until the additional income has reached h150 (respectively net earnings before withdrawal have reached h575). Net earnings above h575 are completely taxed away. The breakeven point is reached at gross earnings of h950, which corresponds to a net income of about h750.
Reform scenarios
The problems of the present SA system have led to several reform proposals that aim at increasing the labour market participation of low-income workers. The reform proposals therefore suggest to combine a cut in the minimum income guarantee for those able to work with a reduction in effective marginal tax rates at the lower end of the income distribution. The effective marginal tax rate measures the combined effect of income taxation, social security contributions and transfer withdrawal. Reductions in the effective marginal tax rates may be achieved by wage subsidies similar to the USAmerican EITC (Earned Income Tax Credit) as proposed by Sinn et al. (2002) , Breyer et al. (2004) . However, lower effective marginal tax rates for low-income households lead to a considerable increase in the number of entitled households or to higher marginal tax rates in the phaseout region of SA. In both cases, the overall volume of social transfers considerably increases. Thus, a simultaneous reduction in the SA minimum income not only entails an additional participation incentive but also helps to limit the fiscal costs of a reform. To avoid a decline in household incomes below the former SA minimum, most proposals suggest to offer as a last resort some form of communal work programmes to persons who are able to work but cannot find a job (Sinn et al., 2002; Ochel, 2003; Breyer et al., 2004) .
To capture the main features of recent reform proposals, we simulate two scenarios: the first one with a substantial reduction in the SA minimum income level, the second one with a more moderate reduction. Contrary to the reform proposals put forward in the recent discussion, we do not account for any communal work programmes for employable SA recipients who do not find a job in the regular labour market. 
Scenario 1
The first scenario entails a substantial reduction in the SA level for recipients who are considered able to work. These persons do not receive a basic SA rate, while the basic rate of other persons in the household is unchanged. Simultaneously, the transfer withdrawal rate is cut to zero up to the net earnings amount that is necessary to reach the pre-reform level. For example, a single person without children may earn h300 net labour income that is not withdrawn. Net earnings in excess of this amount are subject to a transfer withdrawal rate of 50 per cent up to the breakeven income where SA eligibility ends ( phasing-out region). For a single person without children, SA eligibility extends up to net earnings of h900, about h150 above the old breakeven point. The basic SA rate for persons who are not considered as able to work remains the same as in the status quo system. The transfer withdrawal rate for non-employable singles remains unchanged, whereas individuals in couple households with one employable person and a non-employable partner face the lower transfer withdrawal rate. Regarding employability, we assume that particularly lone parents with more than one child and married women with more than one child are not required to work. More detailed definition criteria of employability will be given in Section 3.1.1.
Scenario 2
The second reform scenario suggests only a 50 per cent cut in the basic SA rate for recipients who are able to work. The transfer withdrawal rate is again cut 4. The availability of public work jobs has no major impact on the labour supply decision, but neglecting public work programmes can lead to an overestimation of redistribution effects.
to zero up to the net earnings amount that is necessary to reach the status quo SA level. For a single person without children, this implies that he or she may earn h150 net labour income that is not withdrawn. Net earnings exceeding this amount are subject to a transfer withdrawal rate of 70 per cent.
Owing to the more generous SA level as compared with Scenario 1, a higher transfer withdrawal rate is necessary in Scenario 2 to restrict the income range of SA entitlement. For a single person without children, eligibility for SA now extends up to net earnings of approximately h800. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between disposable income and gross labour income for the two reform scenarios in the case of a single without children.
DESCRIPTION OF THE CGE MODEL
We use the CGE model PACE-L to simulate the reform scenarios. Compared with the basic version of PACE-L (Böhringer et al., 2005) , the version of our paper contains a detailed labour supply module that we describe in Section 3.1. In addition, PACE-L incorporates important institutional characteristics of the German labour market, namely union wage bargaining and involuntary unemployment (see Section 3.2). A more technical model description and a summary of the data sources used for calibration can be found in Boeters et al. (2005) and Böhringer et al. (2005) .
Labour supply
3.1.1. The labour supply model In order to assess the effects of tax-benefit reforms, it is necessary to model the heterogeneity of households. Households will in general be affected differently by a reform because taxation and transfers depend on household characteristics such as the number of children and the marital status. The Reforming Social Welfare in Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 individual labour supply elasticities depend strongly on the household type as well. Our model differentiates labour supply by household composition (couples and singles, number of children), the skill level of each adult and the flexibility of labour supply. There is one household containing persons with inflexible labour supply.
5 Households with flexible labour supply are divided into 26 household types: ten types of single and 16 types of couple households (see Table A .1). Except for singles and married women with more than one child, all adult members of these households are considered employable in the sense of our reform definition.
The individual labour supply is determined by a discrete choice model, in which each adult individual can choose from a finite set of working hours. This has several advantages over a continuous labour supply model. First, it allows us to describe supply choices realistically, as hours worked are highly concentrated at discrete points. Second, a straightforward distinction between labour supply responses along the intensive and the extensive margin is accommodated. Third, the incorporation of a complex tax-benefit schedule is facilitated because the budget constraint has to be determined for a finite set of hours only. According to the empirical distribution of hours worked in Germany (e.g. Buslei and Steiner, 1999) , the discrete choice model distinguishes three working-time categories for married men and five options for married women and singles (Table A. 2).
The preferences of households are characterized by a utility function that consists of two additive parts. The first one is a standard CES function, which depends on leisure and disposable income. 6 The second part introduces heterogeneity within household types. It is linear in the absolute distance between actual and autonomously preferred working time. This term simply shifts the utility of each working time alternative up or down. The distribution of the working-time preference parameter then entails the whole range of labourconsumption choices within each household type. It is calibrated to match the empirically observed distribution of hours within each household type.
7
In formal terms, the utility for single i of household type j supplying labour in hours category k is given by
5. Labour supply is classified as inflexible if a person is younger than 20, older than 65, a civil servant, retired, self-employed, currently in education or in training, taking parental leave or living in an institution. 6. For worker households, we disregard the distinction between current and future consumption and thus saving. 7. The crucial advantage of the additive heterogeneity parameter is that we can derive explicit expressions for its critical values and assure uniqueness of critical values for each household type (Graafland et al., 2001, pp. 71-86) . The resulting equations can easily be combined with the general equilibrium model.
where a j is the share parameter, T the time endowment, h j,k the working time in hours category k, and C j the expected disposable income corresponding to hours category k. s j would correspond to the standard elasticity of substitution if the additive term were zero. b j measures the disutility of a deviation of actual hours worked (h j,k ) from autonomously preferred hours ð h j;i Þ. To determine the labour supply choice for singles, we proceed as follows: first, we calculate the expected disposable income, C j (h j,k ) for working-time category k under the German tax and transfer system. 8 The values of C j (h j,k ) are calculated as weighted averages of the disposable income in three different labour market states (employment, involuntary unemployment with UBs and involuntary unemployment with SA), with the respective probabilities as weights 9 (see Section 3.1.3). Having calculated C j (h j,k ), we are able to determine the CES utility part, U CES j , for each hours-of-work option.
For given values of U CES j , we can determine critical values of h j;i for individuals who are just indifferent between two adjacent working-time classes. These critical values separate those individuals who work in the lower hours-ofwork category from those who work in the upper category. We denote the critical value of h where an individual in household type j is just indifferent between hours-of-work category k and k þ 1 by h j;k;kþ1 and calculate it as
From equation (2), it can be seen that the critical value of h is largely determined by the difference between the CES utility levels corresponding to the adjacent working-time categories. A change in the tax and transfer system will change disposable income and consumption corresponding to different working-time categories. This affects the CES utilities and thus the relative attractiveness of the different working-time options. The critical values of h adjust and some households characterized by values of h that are close to the critical values in the benchmark will change labour supply categories. Depending on the distribution of the h j;i within the household types, this, in turn, translates into a new distribution of hours of work.
For couples, we proceed analogously. We assume that they maximize the following joint utility, 10 where the individual spouses are indexed by i and g 8. Although consumption must be thought of as an expected value, we suppress expectation operators for the sake of expositional convenience. 9. The utility of a positive labour supply is uncertain. We assume, for simplicity, that households maximize the utility of expected disposable income, although the CES-utility function implies risk aversion. 10. We thus use a unitary family labour supply model that can be contrasted with collective models of labour supply (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) .
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with a f j representing a weighting parameter for female leisure and C j ðh f j;k ; h m j;l Þ denotes total disposable household income.
As men have three and women five working-time options, couples may choose among 15 different combinations of working hours ðh f j;k ; h m j;l Þ. However, as the simultaneous maximization of female and male working hours would result in discontinuous reactions of the households, we make the simplifying assumption that each partner chooses his or her optimal working time assuming that the other partner makes the average working-time choice.
Calibration of the labour supply model
The labour supply model is calibrated so as to match empirical labour supply elasticities and hours-of-work distributions. To calibrate the model, we use output from the ZEW's microsimulation model (Buslei and Steiner, 1999; Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus, 2003) . The model uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and estimates individual labour supply reaction coefficients with a multinomial logit model. The econometric estimations are based on a subsample of households whose adult members' labour supply may be thought of as flexible. This sample represents about 15.4 million households and 24 million individuals. We gain four sets of parameters from the microsimulation model: (1) the overall distribution of household types, (2) the classification of hours-of-work as given in Table A .2, (3) the empirical distribution of household labour supply across these hours-of-work categories for each of the 26 household types and finally (4) the simulated partial ownprice elasticities of labour supply in a given working-time category with respect to the gross wage in this category. The estimated elasticities are documented in Table A .3. They are to be read as follows: if, for example, the gross wage for the first positive time category for men in household type CLL0K (38 hours per week) increases by 10 per cent, the probability to supply 38 hours per week will increase by 1.51 percentage points.
In order to match the empirical distribution of labour supply, we assume that the autonomous working-time preference parameter h has a stepwise uniform distribution over the interval [0, 70 hours] . The steps in the density functions are constructed so as to coincide with the benchmark critical values of h, i.e. the preference parameters of all individuals working h j,k hours are uniformly distributed between the benchmark values of h j;kÀ1;k and h j;k;kþ1 . The density over this interval is then chosen to reproduce empirical workingtime frequencies. To calibrate the model to the simulated elasticities from the microsimulation model, we match the simulated elasticities with the elasticities that are analytically derived from the utility functions in equations (1) and (3).
11 Table A .3 compares the calibrated elasticities with the simulated elasticities from the microsimulation model. The table shows that our model is fairly good in approximating the overall level of labour supply reactions. However, as regards the ranking of the elasticities with respect to the individual working time categories, it turns out to be less flexible. Having calibrated the parameters of our model, we are finally able to simulate how changes in the tax-benefit system will affect the working hours distribution. As shown in equation (2), changes in taxes and benefits affect the critical values of h. Given the calibrated density functions, which are held constant, changes in the critical values of h, in turn, translate into a new working hours distribution.
The budget constraint
Owing to the discrete choice set-up, the budget constraint has to be determined for a finite set of hours only. For each hours category, we determine the disposable income based on the German tax-benefit system using gross earnings and transfer income. First, we calculate net monthly earnings by deducting income taxes and social security contributions from gross monthly earnings (see Section A.4 for details). The disposable monthly income is obtained by adding transfer payments to net monthly labour earnings. We consider UBs and assistance, SA and child benefits. In the current model, we leave out the housing allowance.
Monthly UBs equal 60 per cent of insured net monthly earnings, and 67 per cent if at least one dependent child is present. UBs are only subject to an earnings test with respect to the benficiary's own labour earnings, i.e. there is no general means test and the benefit is independent of any spousal income. Persons who have exhausted their UBs may subsequently receive UA, provided they pass a means test on household income and wealth. However, this means test is much weaker than for SA. The replacement rate of UA is only 53 per cent of insured labour earnings or 57 per cent, respectively, if children are present. Individuals (or households) receiving some kind of unemployment compensation (UC) may be entitled to supplemental SA if income falls short of the SA minimum. As we focus on SA reform, we explicitly model the SA means test, while we neglect the weaker UA means test.
For each individual or household, we compute the disposable income for all possible labour supply decisions. If labour supply is zero hours (voluntary unemployment), no UC is assigned. Each positive labour supply may result in 11. Boeters et al. (2005) provide a more detailed description of the modelling framework and the underlying calibrations.
Reforming Social Welfare in Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 three different probabilistic labour market states: employment (e), involuntary unemployment with UC (b) or involuntary unemployment without UC (n). In Germany, UBs are available for persons who have paid contributions to the mandatory unemployment insurance for at least one year. However, owing to the static nature of the model, we are not able to determine whether or not a person is entitled to UC. Instead, we assume that an involuntarily unemployed person is entitled to UC (UB or UA) with an exogenous probability P UC . 12 In case of entitlement, the compensation is determined on the basis of the chosen category of hours supplied and the replacement ratio is calculated as a weighted average of UB and UA replacement rates. The (supplemental) SA benefit is calculated for the whole household and all possible labour market states of its members after earnings and other transfer incomes have been determined.
In formal terms, for a single, the expected income with a labour supply of h k hours is
The probability of becoming unemployed, (1 À P(e)), corresponds to household-specific endogenous unemployment rates. 13 For couples, the algebraic expression is a straightforward extension of the single case.
For the policy simulations, we use a first-order approximation of the taxtransfer schedule. We disturb the calculations of disposable income marginally at all relevant points to calculate numerically local average and effective marginal rate of the total tax-transfer system, which are then transferred to the CGE model.
Union wage bargaining
Embedding the process of wage determination in our general equilibrium framework is a crucial element for the evaluation of the reform proposals. In PACE-L, wages are determined by sector-specific bargaining between an employers' association and a trade union. The bargaining outcome is modelled as the maximization of a Nash function, which includes the objective functions of both parties and their respective fall-back options. We adopt the 'right to manage' approach: parties bargain over wages, and firms afterwards decide on labour demand given the wage agreement. This labour 12. We assume that P UC uniform across households; it equals the empirical share of unemployed persons receiving an unemployment compensation of 0.8 (IAB, 2002). 13. For each household type, we split up those individuals who actually do not work into voluntarily and involuntarily unemployed in order to obtain household-specific unemployment rates and non-participation rates in the benchmark. The shares of involuntarily unemployed persons are calibrated so as to match the resulting aggregate skill-specific unemployment rates with their empirical values. In 2000, these amounted to 22.2 per cent for low-skilled and 7.1 per cent for high-skilled workers (IAB, 2002) .
demand reaction in turn is anticipated in the wage bargaining. The firms maximize their profits, while the fallback option is no production and zero profits. The union represents two types of workers: high skilled and low skilled. For each sector s and skill type r, the union's objective function, G r,s , is employment, L r,s , times the value of a job, V r,s , minus the value of unemployment, V U,r . The value of unemployment directly depends on the social transfer programmes.
Following the literature on search unemployment (see e.g. Pissarides, 1990) , V r,s and V U,r are calculated as value functions. They can be expressed as weighted averages of labour incomes and transfer payments. The weights are determined through the probabilities of employment and unemployment in the future, given the equilibrium transition probabilities between the two labour market states. We then calculate the steady-state values of the two labour market states under the assumption that job-seekers must be indifferent between any two of the sectors.
14 As usual in dual-labour-market models, the higher the 'surplus from working', the lower the quit rate from unemployment (see Acemoglu, 2001) .
We assume that the trade union aggregates different household types using a utilitarian welfare function. The marginal tax rates determining the change in net wages as well as the values of the states of employment and unemployment that appear in equation (6) are therefore calculated as weighted averages over all household types and all hours-of-work categories. In turn, the general equilibrium wage that results from the bargaining process is used to derive the income positions of all households in all possible labour market states. Deviations from the benchmark gross income are taxed with the marginal tax-transfer rate. The two labour markets for low-and high-skilled labour are balanced by aggregating on the demand side over sectors and on the supply side over household types (where frequencies of household types are fixed). We assume that the structure of labour input (with respect to household types) is uniform across sectors. Household-specific unemployment rates are aggregated into economy-wide unemployment per skill group. Changes in aggregate unemployment are distributed among household types proportional to their benchmark unemployment.
Labour supply reactions at given wages
Changes in the tax and benefit system affect the household labour supply both directly and indirectly through general equilibrium changes in the wage and unemployment. The direct effects can be isolated by keeping wages fixed and tracing the resulting changes of the working-time distribution through 14. For a more detailed description of the wage-bargaining model, see Boeters et al. (2005) and Böhringer et al. (2005) . (2), it can be seen that the supply response depends on the change in the difference between the CES components of the utility function corresponding to different working-time categories. The extent of the supply response, in turn, depends on the underlying parameters of the utility function, a L , s and b. These parameters determine the elasticities of labour supply in a given working-time category. Table A.3 displays elasticities of labour supply in a given working-time category with respect to the gross wage in this category and documents that empirical and calibrated elasticities are always non-negative. For positive elasticities, the share of individuals choosing a particular working-time category grows if the income differential relative to the lower (upper) working-time category increases (decreases). For a low-skilled single person without children, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relative income positions of 0, 15 and 30 h of labour supply. Whereas under the status quo system, the disposable income for 15 h is only about h100 higher than for 0 h, under Scenario 1 the difference grows to h430. For singles, Scenario 1 increases the income difference between 30 and 15 h only slightly; the relative attractiveness of working 38 h instead of 30 remains unchanged. As a consequence, we expect that the welfare reforms will increase labour force participation at the bottom of the hours distribution, while full-time labour supply (i.e. 38 h and more) will remain constant. As changes in the incentive scheme are smaller in Scenario 2, we expect smaller labour supply effects than in Scenario 1. As female singles without children feature larger labour supply elasticities than their male counterparts, we expect reactions to be more pronounced for single women.
Reforming Social Welfare in Germany
Effects on wage formation and employment
The welfare reforms operate through two different channels on the wagebargaining process. First, they change the degree of tax-transfer progression; second, they have an adverse effect on the fall-back position of unions. We know from the theoretical literature (see Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996) that tax-transfer progression leads to wage moderation on behalf of unions. In our scenarios, tax-transfer progression is clearly altered, but not in an easily predictable way. Under both reform scenarios, SA eligibility extends to higher income levels, and the marginal tax-transfer rate increases for incomes between the status quo and the reform breakeven income. Whether average skill-specific marginal tax-transfer rates (which we use in the utility function of the union in wage bargaining) decrease or increase depends largely on the underlying household and hours-of-work distribution. Furthermore, overall tax progression is determined through the marginal tax-transfer rate only if average taxes remain constant, which is not the case in our scenarios. With regard to the fall-back position of the unions, there are two adverse effects. By stimulating labour supply, both scenarios reduce the value of unemployment as the probability of unemployment at a given level of labour demand increases. Moreover, cuts in the SA minimum income guarantee lower the expected income when being unemployed. In sum, the negative impact on the fall-back position of unions is likely to translate into lower union wages and higher employment.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Partial labour supply effects
We first discuss the labour supply reactions of our reform scenarios with constant wages and without the revenue neutrality restriction. Table 1 exemplifies the labour supply responses for low-skilled female and male singles without children. We observe an increase in the share of low-skilled singles without children choosing 15 and 30 h of labour supply and decreases in the share of the 0 h category, with the changes generally being larger in Scenario 1. The labour supply reactions turn out to be considerably stronger for single women due to their higher labour supply elasticities. In sum, in Scenario 1 (2), the changing hours' distributions result in an increase in participation rates by 1.5 (0.7) percentage points for men and by 8.9 (4.1) percentage points for women, respectively.
While Table 1 was confined to low-skilled singles without children, Table 2 presents the effects on participation rates, average working time and supplied hours of work for different sub-aggregates of individuals. The figures in parentheses apply to the effects of Scenario 2. The effects for the sub-aggregates of households depend on the magnitude of the household-specific labour supply elasticities and the overall distribution of household types. Compared with the participation reactions of low-skilled singles without children, the aggregate increase in participation rates of singles turns out to be less pronounced as low-skilled singles without children constitute a relatively small proportion of all single households. In Table 2 , average working-time effects refer to the working time of those individuals supplying positive hours of work, while the effect on labour supply (measured in hours of work) also includes the change in the participation rate. In our model, positive changes in the participation rates generally reduce average working time. The reason is that individuals formerly not participating in the labour market are restricted to switch to the lowest working-time category, involving an amount of hours supplied that is always below the average. This is particularly relevant for married women whose decrease in average working time is found to be considerably larger than that of married men. Moreover, the relative attractiveness of higher working-time categories as compared with lower categories is not increased in our reform scenarios. However, the overall effect on supplied hours of work always turns out to be positive as the decrease in average working time is dominated by the increase in participation rates. The results in Table 2 indicate that in both reform scenarios, the effects on labour supply are more pronounced among single households than among couple households. One important reason is that couple households are less likely to be affected by the reform as they exhibit a larger share of households with more than one child, who face a relatively smaller reduction in the basic SA rate. Participation responses of low-skilled individuals are stronger than the reactions of high-skilled individuals. This is because low-skilled workers are more likely to be affected by the disincentives of the status quo system. Finally, as expected, the effects of Scenario 1 turn out to be stronger than in Scenario 2. Measured in persons, Scenario 1 involves an additional labour supply of about 285,000 persons as compared with about 142,000 additional persons in Scenario 2. As high-skilled labour represents a considerably larger fraction of our relevant population (85.4 per cent); the additional labour supply of highskilled workers exceeds that of low-skilled labour in absolute terms, but not when expressed as a percentage of the labour supply in the benchmark. With respect to the government budget, both scenarios entail a positive effect on the aggregated public budget, which stems both from lower SA expenditures and higher revenues from income taxes and social security contributions.
General equilibrium
Tables 3a and 3b present the general equilibrium effects on labour supply and employment.
These effects take into account the general equilibrium wage responses, the labour demand reactions and the budget balancing through an adjustment of the marginal income tax. The resulting income tax cut turns out to be stronger in Scenario 1 than in Scenario 2, which corresponds to the changes in the budget surplus reported for the partial equilibrium simulations. Despite this general income tax cut, we have an increase in the average effective marginal tax rate, which contributes to lower wages as a result of the firmunion bargaining. This is because the tax rate cuts at the bottom of the income distribution and beyond the post-reform SA breakeven point are overcompensated by higher tax rates in the new phasing-out region of SA.
Compared with the partial labour supply effects, the figures reveal that in general equilibrium the labour supply responses are mitigated due to the Reforming Social Welfare in Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 negative impact of the reforms on wages. Both scenarios involve a stronger downward pressure on low-skilled wages than on high-skilled wages. The economic mechanisms driving this result are threefold: first, both reform scenarios entail a more pronounced increase in participation rates of lowskilled as compared with high-skilled labour. Second, as can be seen from Tables 3a and 3b, both reform scenarios raise the effective marginal tax rates of low-skilled workers to a larger extent than those of high-skilled workers. Based on the tax progression argument, this leads to stronger wage moderation on behalf of low-skilled workers. Third, in all sectors labour demand elasticities are higher for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers (Böhringer et al., 2005) . As these elasticities determine the union's cost of a wage increase in terms of foregone employment, the incentive for unions to lower wages is larger for low-skilled labour. Note, however, that despite the larger response of low-skilled wages, the extent to which increases in participation rates are offset in general equilibrium turns out to be larger for high-skilled labour than for low-skilled labour. While the increase in participation rates of low-skilled labour is found to be reduced by 1.7 per cent (1.2 per cent in Scenario 2), increases in participation rates of high-skilled workers decrease by 2.8 per cent (1.9 per cent in Scenario 2) as compared with Unemployment rate (change in percentage points) À 1.06 À 0.14 the partial equilibrium reactions. This can be explained by the fact that our underlying labour supply elasticities for high-skilled workers are generally larger than those for low-skilled workers (see Table A .3). In sum, the general equilibrium effects correspond with our theoretical predictions from Section 3.4. However, the figures suggest that the feedback effects on labour supply resulting from general equilibrium wage effects are rather small. In part, this can be attributed to lower income taxes (owing to the tax recycling in our model), which tends to offset adverse labour supply effects brought about by the wage reductions. The wage reductions translate into lower unemployment rates as the union wage reactions are sufficiently strong to overcompensate the effect of increasing labour supply. As the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled wages increases, unemployment rates of lowskilled workers decrease by more percentage points than those of high-skilled labour. In absolute terms, the general equilibrium simulations produce an additional employment of about 305,000 (152,000) persons. In equity terms, the higher employment under Scenario 1 comes at the cost of lower incomes (from SA) for those individuals who become involuntarily unemployed and are not entitled to UB or UA. This distributional problem stems from the fact that we did not take into account the possibility of a guaranteed income in We now turn to the distributional consequences, which again depend both on the direct effects of the reforms on the disposable income and on the indirect general equilibrium effects. To provide some indication about the distributional effects, Table A .4 reports percentage changes in expected disposable household income for each household type, differentiated by household composition and skill type. 16 The figures in Table A .4 are averaged over all hours-of-work combinations and over all possible labour market states. Changes in expected disposable incomes therefore result from changes in (1) gross hourly wages, (2) tax and transfer payments, (3) participation decisions as well as (4) unemployment rates. Thus, the aggregate figures may conceal a variety of countervailing effects.
For singles, Table A .4 reveals that individuals with less than two children are most likely to lose in the reform scenarios. The reason is that those households feature the largest non-participation rates among those households who are subject to the reforms, and are therefore most likely to be affected by a cut in the SA minimum income. The worst income effects are found for low-skilled singles who additionally face larger reductions in their gross hourly wage. By contrast, lone parents with more than one child are made better off, as those households are exempted from cuts in SA benefits and benefit from lower unemployment.
A similar picture emerges among couple households. Couple households with less than two children and with both spouses being low skilled are likely to lose. By contrast, couples with many children are likely to benefit as they face a more moderate reduction in the SA minimum income. Those gains are generally even larger than the gains of lone parents with many children. This can be explained by the fact that couple households additionally benefit from lower transfer withdrawal rates, whereas those rates remain unchanged for singles with more than one child. Moreover, the figures disclose that among couple households with many children, particularly those with a low-skilled husband benefit from the reforms. The reason is that labour earnings of couple households with many children are generally determined by the husband's earnings. Provided those earnings are not too high (which is the case with a low-skilled breadwinner), households formerly non-eligible for SA become entitled to supplemental benefits under the more generous transfer withdrawal regulation.
15. With this omission, our simulated labour supply effects are likely to be underestimated, as the expected income when supplying positive hours of work would be larger with a guaranteed income from a public-work job. However, provided that employment in a communal work programme entails a considerably larger disutility of work than a job in the regular labour market, this downward bias is mitigated. 16. Note that only for those individuals who stay in their working-time class, changes in income correspond to changes in welfare.
CONCLUSIONS
We have used a CGE model to assess the effectiveness of recent social welfare reform proposals in terms of their impact on labour supply and employment for the case of Germany. Our simulations included a cut in the SA minimum income level associated with a reduction in the marginal transfer withdrawal rate. The main contribution of our analysis is that we are able to identify general equilibrium effects on wages and unemployment. Summing up the numerical simulation results, our analysis has produced plausible effects that are in the range of numerical results obtained in former microsimulation studies (see e.g. Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus, 2003) . As expected, labour supply effects are found to be larger for low-skilled individuals as they are more likely to be affected by the disincentives of the present status quo system. The reactions among couple households turn out to be less pronounced than participation responses among single households. The reason is that the latter exhibit a smaller share of households with more than one child who face lower cuts in the SA minimum income guarantee. For both reform scenarios, general equilibrium effects result in a decrease in union wages. The feedback effects on labour supply resulting from the general equilibrium wage effects are found to be rather modest. This is particularly true for low-skilled workers who feature lower labour supply elasticities than high skilled workers. Most importantly, however, our general equilibrium results predict a decrease in unemployment for both skill types. The union wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. Primarily due to the higher increase in low-skilled labour market participation, wages and unemployment rates of low-skilled workers are reduced more than for highskilled workers. In absolute terms, the general equilibrium simulations predict an additional employment of about 305,000 (152,000) persons in Scenario 1 (2). Compared with the number of 800,000 persons, at which the reform is directly addressed, the main lesson from the study is that major cuts in welfare payments associated with a significant reduction in transfer withdrawal rates are necessary to generate substantial employment effects. The present model could be extended in several directions. First, our specification of the budget constraint relies on the assumption that all voluntarily unemployed persons are restricted to the receipt of SA benefits and are not entitled to UC (UB or UA). In practice, this is likely to be violated as one may expect a considerable number of UC recipients to be voluntarily unemployed. The fact that this feature is missing in our model is likely to lead to an overestimation of the employment effects, as voluntarily unemployed UC recipients are -at least in the short run -not affected by changes in the SA system. However, an extension of the model in this direction is considerably complicated by the fact that the extent of voluntary unemployment among UC beneficiaries depends strongly on unemployment duration. This feature is difficult to reconcile with the static nature of our model. A Reforming Social Welfare in Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 second interesting extension would be to incorporate communal work programmes that lead to a guaranteed minimum income for those employable SA recipients who do not find a job in the regular labour market. Such an extension might provide some quantitative guidance about the likely benefits of communal programmes. When assessing the impact of such programmes, an important element to consider is the extent to which communal work will crowd out private sector employment. This would require the incorporation of a public production sector into the general equilibrium model. We leave these issues for future research.
APPENDIX A
A.1. Classification of household types A.2. Classification of hours-of-work categories Female single, high-skilled, no children yKL * Single (male or female), low-skilled, y children yKH Single (male or female), high-skilled, y children Notes: * x 5 0, 1, 2, 3; y 5 1, 2, 3; x, y 5 3 refer to households with more than two children. Low-skilled labour: persons without any formal vocational training. High-skilled labour: persons holding a vocational or university degree. A.3. Labour supply elasticities
A.4. Calculation of net earnings
The starting points of our calculation of net earnings are two average gross wage rates for low-and high-skilled workers. Low-skilled workers are defined as persons without any formal vocational training, the rest is classified as high skilled. For low-skilled labour, we impute a gross hourly wage of about h10.8, while the gross hourly wage for high-skilled workers is h14.3. Both wages are the average gross hourly wages for the respective qualification levels of the subpopulation represented by our 26 household types as reported by the German SOEP for the year 2000. Gross monthly earnings are obtained Reforming Social Welfare in Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 by multiplying these gross hourly wages with monthly hours of work corresponding to the respective category of weekly labour supply. To obtain net earnings per month, income taxes and social security contributions are deducted from gross monthly earnings. The share in social security contributions borne by employees is taken to amount to 20 per cent of gross monthly earnings. In 2000, gross monthly earnings of h325 were exempted from social security contributions. Income taxes are calculated on the basis of taxable income, which is obtained by subtracting a standard deduction from gross earnings. To determine income taxes to be paid by each household type, we apply the German income tax schedule (2000) to taxable earnings. 17 For couple households, income tax legislation allows for marital income splitting. According to this method, the tax schedule is applied to half of the joint taxable income, while the resulting tax amount is doubled to obtain total income taxes to be paid by the couple. 
A.5. Distributional effects
